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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper endeavors to give a systematic account of the role of civil
society organizations (“CSOs”) in administrative governance. In most
jurisdictions, “civil society” is not a legal term of art. It does exist, however,
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and it does raise legal questions.1 The different kinds of roles played by
CSOs in both policy formulation and policy delivery will be examined, as
well as the legal questions raised by the involvement of CSOs in governance.
It is admitted that some of these roles—including roles implicating
the right of access to information or participation in administrative
proceedings—are not exclusively roles played by CSOs, in that individuals
and businesses might be involved as well. The involvement of our
organizations, however, gives rise to specific questions, including questions
of legitimacy and accountability, and this is especially true when
participation in decision-making procedures is concerned. Governance itself
is not a term of legal art, and it is frequently used by social scientists willing
to break free from the perceived formalism of legal thinking and analysis.2
What, then, is the role of law in this area? This paper strives to set
out how the problems linked with involvement of the civil society in policy
formulation and delivery can be systematically reconstructed and understood.
Solutions to those problems will be then sought—if deduced is thought to be
a too strong word—from their systematic understanding. Instances of actual
legislation or case law are helpful in illustrating a problem and its possible
solutions, and they will often be referred to herein.
Finally, this paper has been drafted from a European—and, more
specifically, an E.U.—perspective. Materials and ideas from other
jurisdictions, and most notably the U.S., will however be referred to from
time to time, in order to provide a contrast.
II. THE EUROPEAN CONTINENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
A (TOO) SHORT HISTORY
The institutional model that followed the French Revolution is
bipolar to the extremes: on the one hand, you have the citizens, on the other
hand, the State. True, in principle, the people have become the new
sovereign after the monarchy was disposed of. However, the “people” is a
theoretical construct going beyond the sum of the citizens taken as
1
See generally Kenneth Anderson, ‘Accountability’ as ‘Legitimacy’: Global
Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK J. INT’L L. 841, 865
(2011) (providing a useful discussion and references to the idea of “civil society”).
2
It has been argued that:
[T]he basic idea [referred to when talking of “governance”] is that
government, identified with the traditional hierarchical state form, has
given way to a world of diffused authority in which the boundaries
between public law and private law are blurred. Governance seems to
refer to the regulatory capacity of the whole gamut of organisations in the
public sphere, including governments at all levels, private firms, and
associations.
Michael Keating, Europe’s Changing Political Landscape: Territorial Restructuring and
New Forms of Government, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 3,
13 (Paul Beaumont et al. eds., Hart 2002).
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individuals. It is often translated in a mystical entity: the Nation. It is the
Nation to be vested with sovereign powers. Under Article 3 of the 1789
Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, which, by the way, is still
part of the French national compact, “Le principe de toute souveraineté
réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut
exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément.”
As already remarked, the “Nation” is more an idea than an actual
occurrence. It must be translated in institutions which are actually exercising
sovereign powers, such as an assemblée nationale (a one-chamber
Parliament). These institutions are in turn different emanations—in legal
jargon, different organs—of another theoretical construct: the “State.”
Differently from the Nation, the State is articulated in institutions which
actually are given a number of powers over the society at large and its
members.
The citizens could be seen as evaporating from abstraction (the
Nation) to abstraction (the State), the latter, however, being capable of
materializing itself through its different organs. In the end, the citizens vote;
beyond this, they are not usually involved directly in government choices,
unless these choices affect their rights and freedoms. In the latter case, the
citizen is not seen as the holder of a particle of sovereignty. He or she is
rather at the receiving end of the choices made by the State in the name of
the people or the Nation.
Indeed the State is also the only representative of those interests
which are thought to be general in a given society. More than this, it is the
State, through its (possibly democratically representative) organs, that is
charged with selecting those interests which are deemed to be general.
General interests are selected through legislation, which provides a measure
of security for individuals, in that the statutes define the limits and conditions
of authoritative powers.3
Once an interest is thus selected, the State is supposed to tend to its
satisfaction. For instance, when the provision of a service to the general
public is in the general interest, the State is to make sure that the service is
provided according to what is now termed the universal service principle.
Because these interests are general, supposed to be common to the
entire Nation, they override individual interests. The French have this
wonderful opposition between intérêt général and intérêt particulier, which
immediately conveys the feeling that the latter must be less relevant than the
former. The whole is always more relevant than its parts. That is why
“citizen” is more used in constitutional law then in administrative law. In
administrative law, the more anodyne “individual” is often used, and closer
to the French idea of particulier. The particulier must therefore be ready to
3

See Matthias Ruffert, The Transformation of Administrative Law as a
Transnational Methodological Project, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN
EUROPE 3, 10 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2007).
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see his or her rights and freedoms encroached upon and at times forfeited in
the general interest.
It goes without saying that the general interest is also intended to
override the interest of firms or corporations (undertakings, in the language
of the E.U.), which in the end are the emanation of some individuals’
freedom (the freedom to undertake an economic activity through a corporate
structure).
The motore immobile being legislation, public servants tend to be
individuals with legal training. Quite to the point, Max Weber characterized
this administration as legal-rational.4 As it has been remarked, “In essence,
Weber identified administrative, or bureaucratic government, as a rationallegal regime in which groups of full-time, salaried officials, chosen on the
basis of their credentials and placed within hierarchical organizations,
conduct official business according to established rules, within a defined
jurisdiction, and for defined instrumental purposes.”5
A special knowledge therefore sets the bureaucrats apart from the
rest of society and is the reason for their special powers.6 This of course
creates the perfect environment for a very top-down, hierarchical and often
centralized approach to governance and administration. The relationship
between the State and the citizen is not only bipolar, it is very much vertical.
Maurice Hauriou in France centered his description of administrative law on
the idea of puissance publique (public power) and on derogations to the law
as between private individuals, which were the result of the overriding
powers of the administration. Similarly, in Germany, Otto Mayer stressed the

4

See, e.g., Jens-Peter Schneider, The Public-Private Law Divide in Germany, in
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN EUROPE 85, 89 (Matthias Ruffert ed.,
2007).
5
Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 99 (2003).
6
See Fabio Rugge, Administrative Traditions in Western Europe, in HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 177, 178 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003).
During the eighteenth century, as the state became increasingly
de-personalized and the scope of its action came to coincide, at least
ideally, with the common welfare, the crown’s servants were gradually
replaced by the state’s servants, whose personal dependence on the
sovereign was coupled with—although rarely replaced by—an
institutional relation to the state. Real administrative apparatuses
developed and their activities and proper functioning became the subject
of a large number of writings, soon to amalgamate into a body of
knowledge defined as the administrative science(s). Notwithstanding all
this restructuring, the “kingly administrations” were not superseded until
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Up to this time, monarchs largely
retained their powers in shaping states’ administrative structures, in
controlling their action, in appointing their personnel.
Id.; see also Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A
New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 863 (2011).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/4

4

Caranta: Civil Society Organizations

2013]

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

43

rechtlischen Ungleichheit (legal disparity) between State and subject.7 The
fact that the word “subject” was used instead of “citizen” is by itself of
obvious significance.8
True, in France, Hauriou had a formidable opponent in Léon Duguit,
who with the theory of the service public meant to cast administrative action
as an instrument for caring after the needs of the people, rather than an
exercise of authority.9 What could be considered a legal theory of the welfare
State, however, failed to command following in most European countries,
where the top-down character of administrative law was much exalted.10
In Continental Europe, these vertical relations came to be
crystallized by the idea of the unilateral biding administrative decision. This
concept, which remains somewhat alien to English administrative law, was
and is central on the other side of the Channel. Referring to Germany, it has
been remarked that:
[L]ike legislation and jurisdiction, administration, too, had
its own decision-making functions and the Verwaltungsakt
was vested with the task of declaring the law in concrete,
individual case . . . . Running along the same line of
reasoning, French and Italian legal doctrine has identified
those particular administrative decision-making functions
through which imperium was exercised (décisions
administratives, provvedimenti amministrativi), thereby
limiting rights and liberties. This expressed the supremacy
of the administration vis-à-vis private citizens, in the sense
that the former declares what the law is for the latter, instead
of being placed under the same legal rules.11
As it has been exactly remarked, “The administrative act was
theoretically important because it represented the moment at which the law

7
See Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Il rapporto autorità-libertà e il diritto
amministrativo europeo, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 909, 910 (2006)
(referencing the Italian experience); Bernardo Sordi, Il principio di legalità nel diritto
amministrativo che cambia. La prospettiva storica, in DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO: RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE 1, 15 (2008).
8
See Jos C.N. Raadschelders, Administrative History, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 161, 164 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003).
9
Etienne Picard, The Public-Private Divide in French Law Through the History
and Destiny of French Administrative Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR
TRANSFORMATION? 17, 53 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009).
10
See also Bignami, supra note 6, at 864; Roberto Caranta, The Fall from
Fundamentalism in Italian Administrative Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE: POTENTIAL
FOR TRANSFORMATION? 99, 99 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009) (concerning Italy in
particular).
11
Giacinto Della Cananea, Beyond the State: The Europeanization and
Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, in EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 562, 566 (2003).
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took effect in the individual case and the work of civil servants acquired
significance for the legal system.”12
We come almost full circle: from the people to the Nation, from the
Nation to the State and its organs, from the State organs to the bureaucracy,
that is some people governing the people. As has been remarked, “Both
administrative systems and administrative law developed in the specific
context of the nation-state.”13
On the European Continent this model replaced—and in
revolutionary era France, it was much determined to do away with14—a very
different world, one which was very much articulated, where many different
kinds of institutions claimed particles of sovereignty and often took over the
provision of services (especially social services).15 French State ideology
held a wide swath, as it deeply influenced most of continental Europe over
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century and beyond. Even
socialist States could be seen as—not peculiarly benevolent—developments
of the potential omnipotence of the State.16
The pattern change was, however, less marked in common law
jurisdictions and possibly in some of the Scandinavian countries. U.S.
administrative law in particular has followed an original path, which is not
easy to plot exactly.17 Quite briefly and not considering the active role played
by the political parties in the administration,18 one could say that, federal to
the bones, the U.S. administration has never had nor claimed a tradition
régalienne the like of that of centralist France (the English has “kingly,” but
the French is here much more evocative),19 and anyway there have always
12

Bignami, supra note 6, at 867.
Sabino Cassese, The Rise of the Administrative State in Europe, in RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 981 (2010).
14
“Il n’y a plus ni noblesse, ni pairie, ni distinctions héréditaires, ni distinctions
d’ordre, ni régime féodal, ni justice patrimoniales, ni aucun des titres, dénominations et
prérogatives qui en dérivaient, ni aucun ordre de chevalerie, ni aucune des corporations ou
décorations pour lesquelles on exigeait des preuves de noblesse, ou qui supposaient des
distinctions de naissance, ni aucune autre supériorité que celle des fonctionnaires publics
dans l’exercice de leur fonctions. Il n’y plus ni vénalité ni hérédité d’aucun office public. Il
n’y plus pour aucune partie de la Nation, ni pour aucun individu, aucun privilège, ni
exception au droit commun de tous les Français. Il n’y a plus ni jurandes, ni corporations de
professions, art et métiers. La loi ne reconnaît plus ni voeux religieux, ni aucun autre
engagement qui serait contraire au droit naturel ou à la Constitution.”
15
See PAULO GROSSI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO MEDIEVALE 75 (Laterza 1995).
16
O.S. Ioffe, Administrative Law in the Soviet Legal System: Concluding
Remarks, in SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THEORY AND POLICY 499, 506 (George Ginsburg
ed., Nijhoff 1989) (stressing the relevance of administrative law in the Soviet State).
17
Bignami, supra note 6, at 863 (stressing the analogies between the French and
United States experiences).
18
See Larry S. Luton, Administrative State and Society: A Case Study of the
United States of America, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 172 (B. Guy Peters and
Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003).
19
The French-like model was appropriate for fairly authoritarian systems, too.
See Mattarella, supra note 7, at 910.
13
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been powerful forces opposing the concentration of administrative power.20
The model for U.S. administrative law has traditionally been the
businessman much more than the lawyer.21 Legality and authority were
always less a concern than in Continental Europe; when, thanks to the
intense judicialization of U.S. administrative action, the law crept back to the
center of the stage, the aim became to protect individuals and everyone else
concerned by administrative actions through due procedures.22
The U.S. administrative law tradition has obviously held a large
influence on the administrative reform having taken place in Europe since
the late 1970s. These reforms have made a big dent in, even if they have not
disposed of, the French model of the administrative State. In brief:
The main reasons for promoting administrative reform were
the rediscovery, affirmation, and diffusion of markets and
consumer advocacy. The user is no longer an administré, but
a customer who has to be satisfied. Thanks to the free
market philosophy, administrative reforms have changed
from being policies involving the public sector internally to
interventions aimed at improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of services for citizens.23
In this framework of reforms centered on the citizen rather than on the State,
it is no surprise that the U.S. anticipated a development “towards increased
20

See A. Roberts, Harris’ Mirage: The Positive Service State, in PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 70 (2010) (referencing a specific historical figure).
21
See Luton, supra note 18, at 172. The 1883 civil service reform strived to avoid
the feeling of the coming back of a “gentlemanly government”: The Civil Service
Commission pointedly described the examinations that were required for civil service
positions as practical in nature and pitched at a modest intellectual level, not aimed at
establishing a college-trained aristocracy. In adopting a civil service system, the United States
was participating in an international trend towards a merit system; but in the United States
such a system was a direct challenge to patronage and rotation. The patronage system had lost
favor because of its participation in the general decline in morality found throughout
American society. Still, to succeed, the merit system had to offer more than a return to
morality—it had to offer new values that could counter patronage’s claims to democracy and
responsiveness. Merit’s new values were derived from business—economy, efficiency, and the
ability to deal with the increasingly complex affairs of an industrial and urban society.
Suspicion against professionals, something unthinkable in most of Europe, still pops up in the
U.S. literature. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on
Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 370 (2001).
22
Id. at 369 (describing a U.S. administration previously bound by the “the
citizens to whom administrators owe legally correct substantive and procedural action”).
23
Cassese, supra note 13, at 1004; see also B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre,
Introduction: The Role of Public Administration in Governing, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 1, 3 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003) (“With some exaggeration
it could be argued that while previously that legitimacy was derived from the public and legal
nature of the public administration, legitimacy is currently to an increasing extent contingent
on the bureaucracy’s ability to deliver customer-attuned services swiftly and accurately.”).
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transparency and participation in government decision making as a means of
achieving a more perfect pluralist society.”24
In the past decades, the progressive democratization of western
societies, the growing influence of the U.S. (also due to the collapse of the
socialist regimes), the financial crisis of the State and its theorization, the
development of sociological governance theories, all have contributed to
change dramatically theories of administrative law25 and to stress the role of
civil society in filling the gaps between the State and the individuals.26 In
particular, through governance theories “everyone, or at least potentially
everyone, is also seen as a participant in the collective decision-making
process.”27 According to a brilliant theoretical model, administrative law is
today best described as a system of accountability networks, administration
and civil society being two of the knots in these networks.28
The evolution of European—and not only European—administrative
law has meant profound changes both to its bases and in the ways at which
decisions are arrived. The change has blurred the boundary between the
citizen and the State, with civil society often assuming a pivotal role between
the two.
Traditionally, collective decisions had to pass through
national Parliaments:
the legislature enacted statutes
establishing administrative goals, assigning tasks and setting
forth procedures. The administrative machinery was then
summoned to implement them. The legitimacy of
administrative bodies resulted from their implementation of
laws. Legality thus also meant legitimacy. This is now only
partially true. Direct social pressures on the administrative
machinery have become stronger and stronger. The
machinery of government has opened up to these pressures.
For example, we can examine the emergence of
participatory rights. Administrative authorities no longer
make their decisions in solitude. They inform the addressees
of their prospective decisions. They discuss their draft
decisions with them. Only at the end of such procedures, do
they take their decision. Legitimacy through the Parliament

24

Shapiro, supra note 21, at 376; id. at 372 (providing a critical reference to this
development of a pluralist democracy).
25
See Bignami, supra note 6, at 860 (reflecting the dramatic change of
administrative law theories).
26
See Fabio Rugge, Administrative Traditions in Western Europe, in HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 113, 123 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003)
(describing the relevance of democratization); Keating, supra note 2, at 10 (outlining the
general trends reshaping governance discourse in Europe).
27
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 369.
28
Bignami, supra note 6, at 872.
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is not enough. There is another type of legitimacy,
“Legitimation durch Verfahren.”29
So much so that “the very distinction between governmental and
nongovernmental has become blurred, since the real decision-making process
now continually involves, and combines, public and private actors.”30 Seen
from a different angle, “[b]lending State and society means that public
administrators must become more adept at bargaining and governing through
instruments such as contracts, rather than depending upon direct authority to
achieve the ends of government.”31 Public administration is no longer the
oracle of the “general interest”; it is a mediator of conflicts, a facilitator of
debate, a midwife of consensus.32
Of course, CSOs, more than individuals, are keen to take part in
decision-making processes, advocacy being one of their raisons d’être.
Knowledge and passion, the usual tickets for participation,33 inevitably
become more compelling once they are vested in an organization specifically
established to more effectively pursue them.34 In this context, the E.U. faces
specific problems. Representative democratic institutions are slowly
asserting themselves, but there is the feeling that accrued civil society
participation will strengthen the legitimacy of the whole E.U. construction.35
III. AN ELUSIVE DEFINITION
It would clearly be preferable to provide an intensional or coactive
definition of “civil society.” However, there are a number of definitions used
in different contexts and disciplines. At times, civil society is opposed to the
State; its organizations are then called non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”). Other times, it is the space between the State and the market; in
29

Cassese, supra note 13, at 1006; see also F. WERNER, LEGITIMATION DURCH
VERFAHREN (Suhrkamp 2001).
30
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 370.
31
Peters & Pierre, supra note 23, at 4.
32
See Daniela Obradovic & Jose M. Alonso Vizcaino, Good governance
requirements concerning the participation of interest groups in EU consultations, 43
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2006) (referring to the E.U. Commission as a “policy
entrepreneur, collecting views and recommending policies for action”); see also id. at 1053
(referring to the idea that public institutions “arbitrate between competing claims”); Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 987 (2008) (describing the U.S. experience of regulated
negotiations); Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372.
33
See id. at 374.
34
This is certainly the case in the E.U. See Luis Bouza García, Can segmented
public foster a general public sphere in the EU? An example from the consultation practices
of the European Commission, 9 OBSERVATORIO J. 169, 171 (2009) (“[C]itizens’ individual
participation in the European public space is not strong and . . . it is organized groups which
play a main role.”).
35
Olivier De Schutter, Europe in Search of its Civil Society, 8 EUR. L.J. 198, 198
(2002).
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this case, the not-for-profit label is often preferred. At times individual
citizens are considered to be part of the civil society; other times a metaindividual organization is required.36
As already remarked, the paradigmatic model of the nation State was
very much bipolar. As is often the case, the paradigm implied a drastic
simplification of actual social relations while simultaneously forcing it upon
reality to conform it to the abstract pattern. The progressive democratization
of the nation State along with other changes already mentioned has seen the
growth in relevance of actors different from both the State and the individual
citizens (or families, but in the nineteenth century and for most of the
twentieth century, the difference had limited relevance). The paradigm has
become untenable, and to find the place of civil society in administrative law
has become a necessity.
This area between the State and the individual citizens is where this
paper intends to dwell, with an additional qualification. The organizations
considered here will be those pursuing—or purportedly pursuing—general
interests as opposed to commercial or profit oriented interests. The latter are
a well know fixture of law and do not present specific problems in
administrative law. Indeed, in administrative law, corporations or companies
are treated the same as individual citizens, enjoying participatory rights when
their individual interest is at stake. Having said so, a caveat is needed. Once
we abandon the idea that the general interest is what is considered as such
through the legislative process, many organizations (and even individuals)
will lay claims as bearers of some general interest. This is the case with trade
unions and may also be the case with industry associations, both often
portraying themselves as standard bearers of societal and economic
development. The role of such associations will be considered here, as well.
Although their members might be corporations or companies, they do not
directly pursue profit-oriented interests. As is the case with, for instance,
trade unions or environmental associations, they pursue the interests of their
associates claiming a parcel of the general interest.37
In sum, the focus here will be on those a) organizations which b) are
not public, in the sense that they are not part of the State or treated as an
articulation of it, and this c) independently from their being c1) motivated by
some high (or less so) ideals, or c2) rather business- or professionallyoriented, or simply c3) not for profit; d) natural and legal persons pursuing
their individual interests will instead fall out of the scope of the research.
More or less, the idea is to consider the space between the State and
individuals (including firms therein). Organization will be an important
36
See also Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, at
6, COM (2002) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2002); see infra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing the approach engrained in Communications from the Commission).
37
See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 204 (detailing a different structure of civil
society participation).
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element, but the pursuit of a meta-individual interest would be required as
well.38
It should be noted that we are not thus trying to give a definition of
“civil society” suitable for every circumstance. And again, the above does
not mean that some of the questions raised when considering the role of civil
society are completely different from those raised in the relationships and
exchanges between the State and individuals (here, covering both citizens
and corporations or companies, and natural and legal persons). Only when
there is an organization is it easier for it to lay a claim as the bearer of a
particle of the general interest, and maybe of sovereignty. This is why, it is
believed, civil society either poses specific questions or gives a special twist
to questions which normally are raised in administrative law.
IV. WHAT DO CSOS DO?
Basically, CSOs may be involved in both policy formulation and
policy delivery. The distinction is obviously a logical one. One thing is the
decision to build a school, it is another thing to have it built and classes
started. In practice, there may often be a certain continuum. For instance, an
administrative decision implementing a regulation may be both policy
formulation and delivery, depending on the amount of discretion left to the
decision-maker and on whether, and to what extent, the decision will have
the force of a precedent.
Of more relevance here is, therefore, the distinction between, on the
one hand, the adoption of legally bindings measures (including both
regulatory measures and individual decisions), and, on the other hand, the
actual provision of material services (even if it has to be admitted that in
some jurisdictions the latter too might be read as implying the adoption of
legally binding measures; for example, the decision to admit a patient to
benefit from the National Health Service). The relevant services will be
offerings to the general public or, and more often, to a section thereof or to
individuals.
Basically, as it is shown, the 1998 Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters, better known as the Aarhus Convention,39
38
See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the more inclusive
approach taken by the Commission in that it also covers economic operators not generally
considered to be “third sector” or NGOs). This might make sense since the Communication is
concerned with all possible participants to consultations organized by the Commission, and
obviously large companies and corporations can here play a role; moreover, everyone,
including individuals, may take part in these consultations, so that for the Commission civil
society is short for anything which is neither E.U. institutions or member States. The focus is
obviously narrower here.
39
See generally UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE,
http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/treaties/public-participation/aarhusconvention.html; see ÁINE RYALL, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
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involving CSOs in decision-making processes entails a combination of three
rights, namely access to information, participatory rights during the
procedure, and access to justice.40
Right of access to information is obviously relevant not just as a
precondition to meaningful participation, but as an enabler for CSOs
operating as monitors of the activities of public institutions. However, the
right of access hardly poses specific questions concerning the role of CSOs.
Right of access is again relevant when we think to the monitoring role of
CSOs; CSOs have an important place in the transparency and accountability
mechanisms of governance in that, unlike individual citizens, they have the
time and resources to oversee and investigate public and private activities
and to blow the whistle on wrongdoings, which in administrative law
parlance would be considered cases of maladministration.41 It has, however,
to be remarked that the possible role of CSOs with reference to policy
monitoring is not in the end different from the role of, for instance, media.
Unsurprisingly, some of the most relevant cases on right to access decided by
the European courts of what is now the E.U. were brought by a news outlet
and by an environmental organization, respectively.42
Access to justice and the remedies available are a discreet theme by
themselves and will not be discussed in much detail here.43 In fact, as E.U.
law stands today, private litigants including CSOs will not normally (and
unless they show that their position is directly concerned) be granted
standing in the E.U. courts to challenge E.U. provisions adopted without
their participation or without taking into account due account their
participatory contribution.44 As will be seen, the situation is different under
the Aarhus Convention.45
The main focus here is on participation in decision-making
procedures and what is relevant is that bundle of rules which in different
jurisdiction go under the label of fair hearing, due process or something

IMPACT ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE IN IRELAND 49 (Hart 2009); B. Dalle, Instruments of a
Universal Toolbook or Gadgets of Domestic Administration? The Aarhus Convention and
Global Governance, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 34 (2008).
40
A similar assessment would be granted on the basis of the U.S. Administrative
Procedure Act. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 100.
41
See KENNETH CLINTON WHEARE, MALADMINISTRATION AND ITS REMEDIES 6
(Stevens & Sons 1973).
42
Case T-194/94, Carvel & Guardian Newspapers v. Council, 1995 E.C.R. II2765 (noting that Carvel was a journalist working with U.K. newspaper The Guardian); Case
T-264/04, WWF UK v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-911.
43
See, e.g., Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v.
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-;
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia
Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-; Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967.
44
Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n v. Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425.
45
See also Ryall, supra note 39, at 59.
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similar.46 Participation may come under many different guises.47
Participation of the potential addressee in decisions infringing on his or her
property or another legal entitlement is different from participation as
consultation of the stakeholders,48 which in turn is deeply different from
taking part in the decision-making process and being able to negotiate its
outcome.49 Defense, consultation, and negotiation leading to co-regulation or
co-decision50 are three very different kinds of participation, indeed.51
Coming to policy delivery, CSOs may be involved in many different
ways, namely either being the ones that actually provide the services or
simply monitoring how the services are provided by the public sector. The
latter is obviously relevant, and CSOs are coupled here with the media in
raising the awareness of the general public regarding possible cases of
maladministration. From the point of view of administrative law, this form of
involvement does not, however, raise specific problems going beyond the
general questions of right of access to information and right of access to
courts. The focus, therefore, will be on CSOs delivering services to the
general public or, and more often, to a section thereof, or to individuals.
V. PROCEDURAL AND PARTICIPATORY ISSUES
A. Participation in Proceedings for the Adoption of Legally Individual
Binding Measures (and Judicial Protection Against the Same Measures)
In a number of common law jurisdictions, the right to take part in
administrative proceedings—normally proceedings for the adoption of
individual decisions—developed from the principle of fair hearing. As such,

46
See Sérvulo Correia, Administrative Due or Fair Process: Different Paths in
the Evolutionary Formation of a Global Principle and of a Global Right, in VALUES IN
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313 (G. Antony et al. eds., Hart 2011) (providing a
comparative assessment of different traditions).
47
See also Francesca Bignami, Three Generations of Participation Rights in
European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2005)
(referencing specifically the evolution of E.U. law).
48
L. Azoulai, Le principe de bonne administration, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
EUROPÉEN 493, 502 (J.M. Auby & J. Dutheil de La Rochèreeds. eds., Bruylant 2007).
49
See e.g., Cristoph Möllers, European Governance: Meaning and Value of a
Concept, 43 COMMON MKT L. REV. 313, 321 (2006) (providing that participation is at times
equated with consultation, but it is not necessarily so, because the latter kind of participation
could be considered “strong” participation, quite close to self- or direct government).
50
See Paul Verbruggen, Does Co-Regulation Strengthen EU Legitimacy?, 15
EUR. L.J. 425, 425 (2009) (“In general terms, co-regulation can be described as a regulation
method that includes the participation of both private and public actors in the regulation of
specific interests and objectives. As such, co-regulation brings together private and public
actors in the different stages of the regulation process.”).
51
See L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in
Community Social Policy, 23 EUR. L. REV. 20, 29 (1998) (describing the difference between
consultation and negotiation).
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its primary beneficiary was the person who could be affected by the decision
under consideration (participation as defense).
In the E.U., participation as defense is safeguarded to a fairly high
degree, as can be evinced from Kadi, a case in which the Court of Justice
referred to the constitutional role of the judicature to demonstrate the
necessity to submit to judicial review anti-terrorism measures (including the
freezing of funds) taken in pursuance of a resolution by the United Nations
Security Council.52 The measure taken was then quashed because of a blatant
breach of the right to fair hearing; the Court of Justice did not need to put in
practice its indications as to the proper standard of review.53
Kadi has been followed a number of times. In the Melli Bank case
(concerning the freezing of funds belonging to a bank established in the
United Kingdom and controlled by an Iranian credit institution involved in
that country’s nuclear program),54 the then court of first instance held that the
courts “must also ensure that the right to a fair hearing is observed and that
the requirement of a statement of reasons is satisfied and also, where
applicable, that the overriding considerations relied on exceptionally by the
Council in disregarding those rights are well founded.”55
These days, participation as defense is generally granted in the
56
E.U., in part because it is referred to in the provision of Article 41 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, now having the same standing as the
Treaties.57 According to the Court of Justice:
[O]bservance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings
initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a
measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental
principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even
in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in
question . . . . That principle requires that the addressees of
52

Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat Int. Found. v.
Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-3649; see also F. Fabbrini, Silent enim leges inter arma? La Corte
Suprema degli Stati Uniti e la Corte di Giustizia europea nella lotta al terrorismo, RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 533, 591 (2009) (analyzing the parallel developments of U.S.
and E.U. case law on anti-terrorism).
53
See Giacinto della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of
Law between the United Nations and the European Union, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 511, 516
(2009) (“[T]he situation of Kadi was a reminder of Kafka’s nightmare of a process in which
the individual ignores the charges and is deprived of ordinary process rights.”).
54
Joined Cases T-246/08 & T-332/08, Melli Bank v. Council, 2009 E.C.R. II2629.
55
Id.
56
See Roberto Caranta, Evolving Patterns and Change in the EU Governance
and their Consequences on Judicial Protection, in TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (Roberto Caranta & Anna Gerbrandy eds., Europa Law Publishing
2011).
57
See generally JILL WAKEFIELD, THE RIGHT TO GOOD ADMINISTRATION (Wolters
Kluwer Law & Business 2007).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/4

14

Caranta: Civil Society Organizations

2013]

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

53

decisions which significantly affect their interests should be
placed in a position in which they may effectively make
known their views.58
More than that, participation as defense is considered one of the pillars of
global administrative law; participation is the body of basic rules which are
followed by supranational and transnational institutions, such as the panel of
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).59
Participation as defense may however pose some special challenges
to CSOs. Fair hearing and similar notions were developed for the defense of
freedom and property. They are part and parcel of the mechanism of the legal
individualist thinking developing from the Age of Reason. Individualism is
not referred to here with the same meaning ascribed to it in current law and
economic analysis.60 We refer instead to the nineteenth century idea that
rights are bestowed to and enjoyed by individuals—natural and legal
persons, i.e. men, women, and companies, or corporations—rather than by
communities, such as families, trade and craftsmen guilds, religious orders,
and chapters of the Church or churches as was the case during the Middle
Age. It is well known that, in the past, even animals were at times considered
as holders of rights (mainly defense rights in criminal cases).61
The focus on individuals only having individual rights was
compatible with the idea that the State was the entity responsible for looking
after supra-individual interests deserving to be considered general interests,
and obviously contributed to reinforce the bipolar character of the modern
nation States.
CSOs may well have individual rights corresponding to this
meaning, such as property or free speech. The reason for the existence of
such organizations is, however, normally advocacy on behalf of someone
else or something else. Trade unions fight for the interest of workers;
workers may be syndicated, but at times they are not; if the latter is the case,
it is difficult to maintain that trade unions have a mandate or are agents
acting on behalf of the workers. Lack of mandate is even more evident in the
58
Case C-32/95 P, Comm’n v. Lisrestal, 1996 E.C.R. I-5373; see also Case T228/02 Organization des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-4665.
59
See Sabino Cassese, Global Administrative Law: An Introduction, 37 J. INT’L
L. & POL. 663, 663 (2005); D. Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PASADINA J.
INT’L L. 595, 617 (2010); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for
Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006); della Cananea, supra note 53, at 516
(specifically addressing the area of global sanctioning measures).
60
Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV.
43 (2011) (capturing how in that context, individualism is quite a hot topic).
61
See, e.g., Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval
Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, in 17 ANIMAL L. REV. 273 (2011)
(referring to due process). Today the problem of animal rights has come back, taking quite a
different twist. See also GARY FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE:
ABOLITION OR REGULATION? (Columbia University Press 2010).
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case of CSOs working to promote democracy, human rights, welfare of
indigenous tribes, animals, the environment, or cultural heritage.62 In the
latter instances, not only is there no mandate, but there cannot be any, as no
natural or legal person can claim individual rights with reference to cultural
heritage.
The problem is well-illustrated by the Trianel case, decided by the
Court of Justice (now of the E.U.).63 Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH &
Co. KG sought permission to construct and operate a coal-fired power station
in Lünen in Germany. Within eight kilometers of the project site, there are
five areas designated as special areas of conservation within the meaning of
Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna
and flora, as amended by Directive 2006/105/EC (“the Habitats Directive”).
The partial permission granted to Trianel was challenged by the Bund für
Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen
eV (the Nordrhein-Westfalen branch of Friends of the Earth, Germany;
“Friends of the Earth”) because of the lack of an environmental impact
assessment. The German court seized with the action considered that, on the
basis of domestic law, environmental protection organizations are not
entitled to rely on infringement of the law for the protection of water and
nature or on the precautionary principle.
Under German law, the right of action accorded to non-governmental
organizations is comparable with that provided for under the general rules of
administrative procedural law governing actions for annulment and, in
particular, under §§ 42(2) and 113(1) of the Administrative Court Rules
(Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, - VwGO), which provide that an action
challenging an administrative measure will be admissible only if the
administrative measure affects the claimant’s rights, that is to say, his
individual public law rights. The decisive criterion for establishing whether a
provision of national law protects individual rights is the extent to which that
provision adequately specifies and delimits the interest or right protected,
envisages the way in which the right might be regarded as impaired, and
determines the class of persons protected. According to the court, the rules
against pollution primarily concern the general public and not the protection
of individual rights.64
As we will see, the German court, in turn, seized the Court of Justice
doubting whether the domestic approach is consistent with the obligations
flowing from the Aarhus Convention. The situation as described by the
national court is, however, illustrative of the challenges faced by CSOs when
trying to make their voices heard in jurisdictions that still adhere to the
individualistic approach to legal entitlements.

62

See Anderson, supra note 1, at 844.
Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v.
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-.
64
See id.
63
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In considering the position of CSOs, it must be stressed that
individual administrative decision-making procedures—or adjudication, to
use a term more current in the U.S.—are quite often polycentric, in that a
number of individual and supra-individual (including general) interests may
be involved beyond, and in addition to, the general interest represented by
the decision-maker and the individual interest that might be directly affected
by the decision under consideration.65 For instance, the decision to allow the
building and operation of a factory may involve conflicting environmental
and economic development interests, the interests of the entrepreneur asking
for the permission to build, those of the owners of land and houses in the
proximity (which according to the case, could either benefit from the
development or see their property lose value), and those of local dwellers
seeking to protect their health from potential emissions resulting from the
industrial activities under consideration.
The fact that administrative disputes are often polycentric obviously
makes adjudication more complex when compared with civil disputes
normally opposing just two parties. To this, it is to be added that interests
involved in administrative disputes might have, and often do have, a different
relevance and importance. Without necessarily buying into the tyranny of the
general interest, it is beyond discussion that the general interest is expected
to override private interest(s) in a number of occasions. That is why taking or
expropriation is well-known in different jurisdictions. Administrative
disputes are therefore not only often polycentric; they tend to be
asymmetric.66
The polycentric and asymmetric nature of administrative disputes
does not by itself impact the operation of participation as defense. It however
stresses the limit of the individualist approach to the law, as some of the
interests recalled are not individual interests and the State alone could hardly
be supposed to show the same determination in pursuing with the same vigor
all the often-conflicting general interests involved. In the instance given
above, when economic development and the protection of the environment
are at the loggerheads, the State will have to choose one interest over the
other, and in so doing the latter risks being defenseless.
This is particularly true given that an additional factor of complexity
in administrative disputes is that, in many jurisdictions, the decision-maker is
vested with wide discretion. This means that the tipping point where one
interest prevails over the other is not fully defined by the law, as is the case
65

See Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PROC. AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. 1, 1–8 (1960) (introducing the term “polycentric dispute” in administrative sciences).
66
The idea of asymmetric disputes is well known to international law and refers
to issues dividing a rich and a developing State. See, e.g., Klint Alexander, Rethinking
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement System: Leveling the Playing Field For Developing
Countries in Asymmetric Disputes, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN
SERVICES (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., Leiden 2008) 483, 483. In administrative
law, the idea is different, and turns around on the relevance of different interests.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

17

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4

56

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

in civil disputes. On the contrary, to a large extent, it is left to the public
authority to decide which interest is to prevail on the specific circumstance
of every situation. Often enough in European administrative law, the
decision-maker is not just a referee between conflicting interests. The
decision-maker is also a player in the polycentric dispute at hand, in so far as
it is representing one among the possibly numerous relevant general
interests.
Individualism needs to be set aside in administrative law to allow
CSOs to take the defense of general interests against the State itself. In some
European countries, individualism has made the life of CSOs—and
especially of public interest organizations—quite difficult. As already
recalled, in Germany, CSOs are routinely denied standing to challenge
administrative decisions, and in the past this was also the case in Italy.67
To provide a remedy to this situation, in 1998, the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) has adopted a Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, better known as the Aarhus Convention.
Both the Member States of the E.U. and the E.U. itself have acceded to the
Convention, which means that, under given conditions we cannot analyze in
detail here,68 the Convention is now binding on the Member States as a
matter of E.U. (rather than of international) law.69 Briefly said, this in turn
means that the Aarhus Convention overrides national rules, and national
courts are expected to set rules aside to give consequence to the overriding
direct effect of E.U. law (something that is said to be an effect of the
primauté (primacy) of E.U. law over national law). As a consequence of this
primauté, in Trianel, the Court of Justice held that the German rules at issue
had to be set aside because they basically deprive environmental protection
organizations of the possibility of verifying compliance with environmental
rules which, for the most part, address the public interest and not merely the
protection of the interests of individuals as such; stated otherwise, standing
“cannot depend on conditions which only other physical or legal persons can
fulfill, such as the condition of being a more or less close neighbor of an
installation or of suffering in one way or another the effects of the
installation’s operation.”70
The approach in Trianel was followed (with some differences due to
the technicalities of the direct effect doctrine which do not concern us here)
in the so-called Brown Bear case.71 Lesoochranáske zoskupenie VLK
67

Cass., Sez. Un., 8 maggio 1978, n. 2207, in Foro it., 1978, I, 1090.
See Ryall, supra note 39, at 52.
69
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-.
70
Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v.
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-.
71
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-.
68
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(“zoskupenie”), an association established in accordance with Slovak law
whose objective is the protection of the environment, had challenged the
decision by the Ministry of the Environment of the Slovak Republic to refuse
the association’s request to be a “party” to the administrative proceedings
relating to the grant of derogations to the system of protection for species
such as the brown bear, access to protected countryside areas, or the use of
chemical substances in such areas. The Court of Justice held that it was the
responsibility of the national courts to interpret domestic legislation so as to
enable an environmental protection organization to challenge before a court
decisions taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to
E.U. environmental law.72
To do away with restrictive national takes on the involvement of
civil society organizations in policy and decision making procedures liable to
affect the environment, the Aarhus Convention provides a generous
definition of those involved in the procedures just mentioned. Under Article
2(4), “The ‘public’ means one or more natural or legal persons, and, in
accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations,
organizations or groups.” True, national legislation is referred to here, as is
the case in Article 2(5), “‘The public concerned’ means the public affected or
likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decisionmaking; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under
national law shall be deemed to have an interest.”73
However, while it is to be conceded that the Aarhus Convention is
often worded in ways that might appear to be designed to minimize changes
in domestic law, the case law by the Court of Justice has given the
Convention and the E.U. provisions adopted to give force to the Convention
a functional interpretation aimed at strengthening the protection of the
environment and thus enhancing the standing of NGOs.74 To this end, the
Court of Justice has referred to the E.U. provision implementing Article 9(2)
of the Convention, according to which, “[w]hat constitutes a sufficient
interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with the
requirements of national law and consistently with the objective of giving the
public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this
Convention.”75
As it is clear from its title, the Aarhus Convention also provides for
participation rights. Articles 6 to 8 concern respectively participation a) in
decision-making procedures for specific activities (which could be broadly
72

Id.
See Ryall, supra note 39, at 55.
74
See, e.g., Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v.
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-;
see also Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967.
75
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, art. 9, June 25, 1998.
73
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translated into adjudication), b) in procedures for the adoption of plans,
programs and policies relating to the environment, and finally c) in
procedures for the preparation of executive regulations and “generally
applicable legally binding normative instruments.”
Article 6, which is of immediate concern here, provides that the
public concerned—as defined under Article 2(5) analyzed above—must be
given certain information “early in an environmental decision-making
procedure, and in an adequate, timely and effective manner.” This
information covers both the proposed activity and the nature of possible
decisions (or the draft decision and details as to the procedure which will be
followed), including opportunities for the public to participate. Participants
have right of access to the relevant information and may submit, in writing
or, as appropriate, at a public hearing or inquiry, any comments, information,
analyses or opinions they consider relevant; the outcome of the public
participation must be taken into account in the decision which translates in a
duty to give reasons.
The Aarhus Convention proves the case arguing that environmental
law is very much a hotbed for legal innovation, and this is particularly true as
the involvement of CSOs in decision-making procedures is concerned. It
remains to be seen how these developments can become general trends in
administrative law.
What has been discussed so far is very much participation as
defense. The fact that the public administration has been transforming into a
mediator of conflicts, a facilitator of debate, a midwife of consensus, while
diminishing the asymmetry in administrative law, both increases the need for
participation and has affected the nature of participation (including the rise of
cases of participation as co-decision). As the next paragraph will show
better, if the State takes up the role of umpire, all relevant interests must sit at
the negotiating table, because those interests not represented will either be
ignored or trampled upon.
B. Participation in Proceedings for the Adoption of Legally Binding Nonindividual Measures
Numerous general or supra-individual interests, other than a large
number of individual interests, are normally involved in rule-making or
similar procedures (as in the case of the adoption of planning instruments).
By the sheer number of people affected, these procedures affect vast
interests. Even if both CSOs participation in adjudicatory procedures and
individual participation in rule-making procedures cannot be ruled out as a
matter of principle, rule-making or similar procedures have naturally become
the elective ground for the participation of CSOs.
Participation rules concerning the adoption of measures having
general or wide-ranging effects are, however, often less developed than the
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rules on fair hearing in individual decision-making proceedings.76 To take
again the Aarhus Convention as an example, Article 7 provides that in the
adoption of plans and programs relating to the environment, early public
participation must be allowed; early participation meaning “when all options
are open and effective public participation can take place.” Moreover, the
results of participation must be taken into account by the decision-maker.
Article 7 is however much more stringent as to the information which shall
be provided to the general public. In addition, concerning the preparation of
policies, Article 7 is content with prodding the signatories to endeavor to
provide opportunities for public participation.
Article 8 on rule-making is somewhat more stringent, providing for a
basic notice and comment approach open to the public, which should be
given the opportunity to comment, directly or through representative
consultative bodies. The latter might well be read as an oblique reference to
participation as consultation. In rule-making proceedings, as well, we can see
both instances of participation as defense (in the case of CSOs, this could be
translated as participation as advocacy or consultation) and participation as
co-decision (or rather as co-regulation). In both cases, but with an obviously
accrued relevance in the latter, the most relevant legal questions pertain to
the definition of who—and more specifically, which—CSOs must be invited
to take part in the proceedings so that the outcome might be considered as a
legitimate one.
In the E.U., the problem surfaced in the context of the European
social dialogue, a regulatory procedure introduced after the Maastricht
Treaty and focusing on social policies.77 In essence, the social partners are
involved in negotiating the content of rules on working conditions.78 Briefly
said, the Commission promotes the dialogue between European industry and
workers organizations in view of the possible conclusion of agreements
between the two sides of industrial relations.79 Agreements may be given
general binding force by the Council. Otherwise, they are implemented by
the organizations themselves.80 A big question in this framework is how far
the organizations concerned may be said to be “representative” of the
workers. In the context of social dialogue, the Commission employs
“representativeness” criteria which—as it will be seen—have withstood
judicial scrutiny in the only case brought to the attention of the E.U. courts.81

76

See Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Negotiated and non-negotiated administrative
rule-making: The example of EC competion policy, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 153, 157
(2006) (providing a relevant discussion of some relevant E.U. rule-making procedure).
77
See Betten, supra note 51, at 29; Verbruggen, supra note 50, at 433; PAUL
CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 235 (Oxford University Press 2006).
78
Catherine Barnard, The Social Partners and the Governance Agenda, 8 EUR.
PUB. L. 80, 87 (2002).
79
Id. at 88. The Commission acts as a “facilitator.” Id.
80
This is a general issue regarding NGOs. See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 208.
81
Case T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335.
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UEAPME, an association of small and medium business (or
“SMEs”), had challenged Directive 96/34/EC on parental leave, adopted by
the Council following social dialogue between various representative
organizations, which lead to a framework agreement between three
horizontal organizations, not including UEAPME. UEAPME claimed it
should have been associated with the negotiations since it represents the
specific interests of SMEs.
The court of first instance remarked that UEAPME was consulted by
the Commission in the first phase of the procedure, the problem being
whether all organizations consulted have to be part of the negotiation leading
to an agreement that is to be given binding force by the Council.82 On the
basis of the provisions then ruling social dialogue, the court held that it was
not up to the Commission but to the social organizations themselves to
choose which social partners had to be involved in the negotiation.83 Stated
another way, no organization could claim a right to be involved.84
This approach could be easily criticized as exclusive and possibly
discriminatory. According to the court, however, before submitting an
agreement to the Council the Commission is under a duty to assess whether
the parties to the agreement are representative of the social partners.85 In
turn, the Council is under a duty to check whether this assessment has been
duly performed.86 On the substance of the case,87 the court held that both the
Commission and Council had checked whether the social partners having
signed the agreement were sufficiently representative,88 and were also correct
in holding that the constituency represented by UEAPME was anyway
represented by some of the other more representative organizations having
signed the agreement concerned.89
In the end, those who need to be represented at the negotiating table
are those whose rights and interests are at stake, not necessarily all the CSOs
that make their business by representing employers, workers or other
categories. Generally speaking, the approach deserves to be commended,
since it introduces a measure of competition among CSOs whose claims at
representativeness cannot just be taken at face value.90 Otherwise stated,
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Case T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335.
87
Inevitably, the all reasoning was framed in legal terms (standing, admissibility,
etc.). This is described as “convoluted” reasoning. J. Scott & D.M. Trubek, Mind the Gap:
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the ERU, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 13 (2002) (framing the
analysis in governance discourse). It is, however, hard to see how (and why) a court could or
should reason in non-legal terms.
88
Case T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335.
89
Id.; Anne Meuwese et al., Towards a European Administrative Procedure Act,
2 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 1, 15 (2009).
90
See also De Schutter, supra note 35, at 210.
83
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since participation, as it will be seen below, entails costs for all involved, it
might make sense to look for representativeness thresholds, (provided of
course they are reasonable and do not fight the rationale for participation).91
The latter proviso was at the heart of another case arising from the
Aarhus Convention.92 The Municipality of Stockholm had concluded a
contract with an electric company for works which entailed tampering with
groundwater. The works were approved by Environmental Chamber of the
District Court of Stockholm. Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening
(DLV), a local environmental association challenged the decision.
A number of questions were referred to the Court of Justice,
including whether small, locally-established environmental protection
associations might have a right to participate in the decision-making
procedures with respect to projects with the potential to significantly affect
the environment in the area where the association is active, but not have a
right of appeal. According to the Swedish legislation then in force, only an
association with at least 2,000 members could bring an appeal against a
decision adopted in environmental matters.
The Court of Justice held that, while it is true that E.U. law
implementing the Aarhus Convention leaves to national legislatures the task
of determining the conditions that may be required in order for a
non-governmental organization that promotes environmental protection to
have a right of appeal under the conditions set out above, those national rules
must both ensure “wide access to justice” and render effective the provisions
of the applicable directive on judicial remedies.93
According to the court, a national law might well require that such an
association has as its object the protection of nature and the environment.94
Moreover, “it is conceivable that the condition that an environmental
protection association must have a minimum number of members may be
relevant in order to ensure that it does in fact exist and that it is active.”
However, the number of members required cannot be fixed by national law
at such a level to run counter to the objective of allowing wide access to the
courts, taking into account that some projects affect the environment on a
local scale only.95 The case of the Swedish Government was of course not
91

It is true that the number of members any organization might have is often a
crude way to assess the relevance of any CSO; at the same time, the effectiveness assessment
of the way CSOs operate is not easy, as shown by a massive literature which cannot be
analysed here. See generally HELMUT ANHEIER ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PARTICIPATORY CIVIL
SOCIETY ASSESSMENTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (United Nations Development Programme
2011), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/
publications/tools_and_resource_sheets/CS%20Assessments_Conceptual%20Analysis.pdf.
The role of CSOs in monitoring the performance of others, such as public institutions or
private companies, is still another question.
92
Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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helped by the fact that only two associations actually have the required
number of members. The Court also ruled that the requirements of E.U. law
could not be met by compelling local associations to contact one of those two
associations and ask them to bring an appeal, since such a system would give
rise to a filtering of appeals contrary to the spirit of the law.96 This case
shows that, at times, the question is not only making sure that those who
participate are sufficiently representative; what is sought is the widest
participation possible.
The question of legitimacy might indeed be avoided with reference
to participation as advocacy or consultation by allowing everyone to express
their view. This is the approach followed in the E.U. concerning the
Commission’s legislative proposals. It is to be recalled that under E.U. law as
it stands now, the Commission has an almost exclusive competence for
submitting proposals for future legislation. The 2001 White Paper on
European Governance already stressed the importance of having the civil
society more involved in policy design, but also more responsible, meaning
to have the relevant organizations following the principles of good
governance, which include accountability and openness.97
To implement this pledge, in 2002, the Commission adopted a
Communication Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested
parties by the Commission.98 The Communication lays down a number of
general principles that should govern its relations with interested parties and
a set of minimum standards for the Commission’s consultation processes. It
addresses the specific role of CSOs in stressing that, though the target groups
of consultations may vary according to the circumstances and all relevant
interests in society should have an opportunity to express their views, CSOs
play an important role as facilitators of a broad policy dialogue.99
The minimum standards for consultations laid down in the 2002
Communication give detailed indications as to the relevant considerations to
be taken into account, including the need for specific experience, expertise or
technical knowledge,100 the track record of participants in previous
consultations, the need for a proper balance, where relevant, between the
representatives of social and economic bodies, large and small organizations
or companies, and wider constituencies (e.g. churches and religious

96

Id.
European Governance, at 14, COM (2001) 428 final. A precedent
characterized by the involvement of the civil society on a scale unheard before was the
drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 207.
98
Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note
36.
99
Id. at 5.
100
See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 207.
97
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communities) and specific target groups (e.g. women, the elderly, the
unemployed, or ethnic minorities).101
In practice, a draft proposal is published online, often along with a
number of working documents of the services of the Commissions, including
impact assessment of regulation analysis;102 public consultations are then
opened on the “Your voice in Europe” website, which has taken the place of
CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society).103
This intentionally all-inclusive approach has been, so far, quite
successful in terms of reactions from different sectors of the civil society,
widely intended, including CSOs.104 For instance, consultations for the
proposal for a Directive on public procurement and the proposal for a
Directive on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport
and postal sectors drew more than 600 respondents.105 It is to be added that
this inclusive approach is combined with more structured participation
institutes, including advisory bodies and hearings, and the need for selection
criteria resurfaces here.106 In practice, the Commission “proceeds to open
consultation with the general civil society as a preliminary approach, but it
then moves to much narrower discussion with stakeholders’ organizations
experts.”107 Moreover, the above does not necessarily apply to all of the
different measures that make up a multifarious portfolio of more or less hard
or soft regulatory measures, which can be adopted by the E.U. Commission
(including guidelines and so on).108 Finally, as it will be stressed again later
in this paper, the principles and standards referred to here are rather of a soft
101
Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note
36, at 19.
102
See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 10. The authors, however, appear to lament the
very basic nature of the information often provided. Id.
103
See YOUR VOICE IN EUROPE, http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index _en.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013).
104
Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note
36, at 11 (expressly ruling out the option of restricting participation to representative
European Organizations); see also id. at 16 (referring to an “inclusive approach”);
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (providing proposals for selecting CSOs).
105
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Public Procurement and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal
sectors, SEC (2011) 1585 final (Dec. 20, 2011); Public consultations, THE EU SINGLE
MARKET,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
publicprocurement/modernising_rules/consultations/index_en.htm (providing an analysis of
the participatory contributions).
106
Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note
36, at 11; see also Meuwese, supra note 89, at 19.
107
Bouza García, supra note 34, at 176.
108
See Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission,
supra note 36, at 10; Hofmann, supra note 76, at 170.
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law nature. As the law stands up to now, concerned parties, including CSOs,
do not have standing to challenge either the procedure followed or the rules
approved.109
An “everyone welcome,” fully inclusive approach is obviously the
more difficult to sustain the more impact participation is having.
Consultations may often be opened to everyone, but this approach just
cannot work in the case of participation as co-decision. In the latter case, in
or out choices are to be made.110
C. “Ossification” of Administrative Procedures and Legitimacy through
Procedure
Beside this, the potential problems linked to participation—and not
necessarily only the participation of CSOs, even if this is our focus here—are
inevitably accrued the more rights are given to participants and the more
duties to take into account participatory contributions are imposed on the
decision-maker. Or, to word this differently, the magnitude of the problems
depends on how these rights and duties are construed. The risk, in particular
according to some current thinking expressed in the American legal
literature, is that of the “ossification” of procedures.
Basically, as already recalled, involving CSOs in decision-making
processes entails a combination of three rights, namely access to information,
participatory rights during the procedure, and access to justice. By itself,
right of access to information can hardly lead to ossification of procedure,
and this is particularly true with the development of internet technologies and
the process of shifting information from paper to electronic files. Access to
justice can obviously contribute to ossification since it is the sharpest tool
available to challenge the final outcome of the procedure, including rising
procedural issues.111 It has been remarked that the “adversarial atmosphere
often contributes to the expense and delay associated with regulatory
proceedings, as parties try to position themselves for the expected
litigation.”112
What is however is to be stressed again is that, generally speaking, in
the present state of E.U. law, private litigants, including CSOs, will not
normally be granted standing to challenge the E.U. legislative provisions
adopted without their participation or without taking into due account their
participatory contribution, unless they show that their position is directly
109

Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n v. Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425; Meuwese,
supra note 89, at 13 (discussing more recent cases).
110
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 211.
111
See Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v.
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-;
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia
Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-; Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967.
112
Lubbers, supra note 32, at 991.
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concerned.113 Again, the focus here is on participation in decision-making
procedures and what is relevant is that bundle of rules which in different
jurisdictions go under the label of fair hearing, due process or the like.114
The right to a fair hearing has a centuries old and noble place in the
common law. It is often recalled that in 1723, the Court of King’s Bench
issued mandamus to the University of Cambridge requiring the restoration to
one Dr. Bentley of the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor and Doctor
of Divinity. Dr. Bentley had been deprived of his degree by the University
because of some outstanding debts without being granted a hearing. On
passing judgment for Dr. Bentley, Justice Fortescue famously said:
The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity
to make his defense, if he has any. I remember to have heard
it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion,
that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam,
before he was called upon to make his defense.115
This is obviously participation as defense and the word itself is
repeated twice in few lines. As such, fair hearing was transplanted from the
law of civil and criminal procedure to what we would call administrative
law. The fair hearing principle contamination from court procedures to
administrative ones was obviously helped by the fact that pace Montesquieux
procedures and functions were no much set apart.116
Participation as defense has been termed as “first generation
participation.”117 In the E.U., the right to a hearing initially emerged “in the
1970s in competition (antitrust) proceedings and was later extended to antidumping and customs proceedings.”118 As already recalled discussing the
Kadi case, this is a right taken seriously in the E.U.119
Myth aside, the principle of fair hearing has kept a marked judicial
characterization, and as such, it was extended to rule-making procedures by
the United States Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) of 1946. Indeed,
adjudication, which is the term usually used for what in Europe would be
considered proceedings for the adoption of individual measure, is a generic
enough term that can be used to designate a judicial process.120
113

Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n v. Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425.
See Sérvulo Correia, supra note 42, at 313 (providing a comparative
assessment of different traditions).
115
R. v. Chancellor of the Univ. of Cambridge, (1723) 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704; see
also R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, (1923) Eng. Rep. 233.
116
Rubin, supra note 5, at 107; Bignami, supra note 6, at 892.
117
Bignami, supra note 47, at 61 (classifying participatory rights in successive
generations).
118
See id. at 62.
119
See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05, P Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found.,
2008 E.C.R. I-3649.
120
Rubin, supra note 5, at 109.
114
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This has not been without criticism. It has been written that the APA
was already out of date when enacted because of the “advent of the
administrative State,” which would have demanded “a transition from a
system of rules elaborated and implemented by the judiciary to a system of
rules elaborated and implemented by administrative agencies.”121 Of course,
one could very well consider the APA as a reaction to the New Deal
legislation and an attempt, quite successful by the way, to reaffirm the
specific U.S. administrative law tradition.122 In any case, not everyone is so
critical, and some scholars in Europe view the APA as a possible model for a
codification of E.U. administrative law.123
As is well known, formal and informal (“notice and comment”) rulemaking are distinguished in the APA. The former is very seldom used
because it is considered simply too cumbersome; however, the case law has
ultimately “judicialized” notice and comment procedures, too.124 This has
been achieved by taking a hard look at both whether the information
provided is sufficient and closely scrutinizing the logical and factual basis of
the rule adopted.125
For the reasons given above, while process-like rights are
quintessential to participation as defense in individual decision-making
procedures, they might easily go beyond the mark, particularly in both the
cases of rule-making procedures and/or participation as consultation (true
cases of participation as co-decision are in principle different, since, once
beyond the question as to the existence of a right to participate, the
substantive issue of the agreement being reached or not absorbs all
procedural issues). The U.S. experience shows that participants—including
CSOs—may easily highjack rule making proceedings when consultations are
“judicialized” to a high degree.126
In the U.S., a way out of ossification was in the past sought in
negotiated regulation, which is in many ways similar to the E.U. social
121

Rubin, supra note 5, at 96. The author further contends that the APA:
[I]mposes a number of procedural requirements on the way in which
administrative agencies may act, these requirements are derived from
pre-administrative modes of governance, namely rulemaking by the
legislature and adjudication by judiciary. Even more basically, they are
derived from an essentially judicial concept of governance in which laws
are discovered rather than invented and policy making is always
incremental.
Id. at 2.

122
Meuwese, supra note 89, at 7 (providing further remarks and referencing the
role of the American Bar Association).
123
See, e.g., id. at 3.
124
Anna Gerbrandy, Models of Judicial Review: The search for instances of the
dialogue-model of judicial review in the USA, in TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (Roberto Caranta & Anna Gerbrandy eds., Europa Law Publishing
2011); Meuwese, supra note 89, at 23.
125
Meuwese, supra note 89, at 25.
126
Lubbers, supra note 32, at 991.
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dialogue discussed above.127 Basically, the competent agency calls on all
concerned parties to meet and negotiate a proposed rule. A neutral mediator
or facilitator chairs the meetings, which do not abide to the strict adversarial
rule now imposed on formal adjudication.128 The agency operates somewhat
on the sidelines; its contacts with the parties are informal and unstructured.129
However, regulated negotiation has been used less and less, one reason being
the significant time and costs involved.130 For an outsider, the impression is
that the U.S. is still trying to find ways to tackle the problems linked to civil
society involvement in decision-making procedures.
So far, the E.U. has expressly refused to follow the U.S. example.
The 2001 White Paper on European Governance recognized only to a limited
extent the legal relevance of participation and civil dialogue.131 The
Commission was afraid of strengthening participation too much—as it sees
it—along the U.S. model, “[c]reating a culture of consultation cannot be
achieved by legal rules which would create excessive rigidity and risk
slowing the adoption of particular policies. It should rather be underpinned
by a code of conduct that sets minimum standards.”132 Indeed, in the White
Paper “[w]e find little evidence of a shift towards greater involvement of
non-governmental actors in governing.”133
Accordingly, the already referred to Communication, Towards a
reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission,
does not lay down legally binding rules (and a communication is not the
legal instrument apt to this end).134 As already recalled, the idea here is that
interest groups fulfilling a number of good governance criteria—namely
representativeness, accountability, and transparency—have the right to be
127

See Hofmann, supra note 76, at 165 (explaining that instances of negotiated
rule-making can also occur with the Commission on one side and the Member States on the
other).
128
See Lubbers, supra note 32, at 987. The U.S. adversarial culture, however, is
ultimately contaminating these kinds of procedures. Id. at 991.
129
Id. at 990.
130
Id. at 996.
131
European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final.
132
See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 3; see also Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Seven
Challenges for EU Administrative Law, 2 REV. EUR. & ADMIN. L. 37, 50 (2009); Kenneth A.
Armstrong, Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on
Governance, 8 EUR. L.J. 102, 112 (2002) (discussing the merits of the hard versus soft
approach to participation).
133
See Colin Scott, Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government?
New-ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU, 15 EUR. L.J. 160, 170 (2009); see De
Schutter, supra note 35, at 201 (writing of “generous, but exceedingly vague,
recommendations”); see also Armstrong, supra note 132, at 116; Simona Rodriquez, Lawmaking and policy formulation: il ruolo della società civile nell’Unione europea, in RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 125, 136 (2010) (referring to the Italian experience);
134
European Governance, COM (2002) 704 final; see Silvére Lefevre,
Interpretative communications and the implementation of Community law at national level, 29
EUR. L. REV. 808, 808 (2004) (providing communications in E.U. law).
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consulted.135 Given the difference between participation as consultation and
participation as negotiation, the preference clearly lies with the former,136 so
much so that participants do not have a right to receive individual feedback
from the Commission.137
What in the end is the most glaring difference between the U.S. and
the E.U. is that under E.U. law, only participation as defense and
participation as co-decision in the area of social dialogue gives rise to
justiciable rights. Participation as consultation does not.138 It has been
argued, however, that Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union, in so
far as it inter alia calls for open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society, might provide for an evolution
in the sense of the legalization of participatory rights.139
Ossification not being, so far, a relevant risk or foe in Europe, civil
society participation has been often discussed as a way to strengthen what is
perceived the fledging legitimacy of E.U. institutions.140 The possible role of
CSOs in governance has, however, had its fair share of critics, who lament
the feared demise of traditional representative institutions and criticize the
perceived lack of legitimacy and accountability of these organizations.141
These concerns may have some merits, even if it is to be remarked that the
legitimacy of representative democracy is too often taken for granted.142
Manifestly, more must be done to shed light on CSOs in the way of
imposing transparency rules, like the mandatory disclose of funding sources.
The minimum standards for consultations laid down in the 2002
Communication already referred to provide a number of relevant indicia.143
However, what is needed is a transparent arena where CSOs vie to represent

135

See Obradovic & Vizcaino, supra note 32, at 1049; Nieves Pérez-Solórzano
Borragán & Stijn Smismans, Representativeness: A Tool to Structure Interest Intermediation
in the European Union?, 50 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 403, 403 (2012) (discussing the specific
topic of representation); De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209.
136
See Betten, supra note 51, at 29 (exploring the difference between consultation
and negotiation).
137
See Obradovic & Vizcaino, supra note 32, at 1060.
138
See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 3.
139
Joana Mendes, Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View
on Article 11 TEU, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2011).
140
See Scott, supra note 133, at 160; Verbruggen, supra note 50, at 432; Bouza
García, supra note 34, at 169; Scott & Trubek, supra note 87, at 1; Colin Scott, The
Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control, 8 (2002) EUR.
L.J. 59, 59 (2002); De Schutter, supra note 35, at 198.
141
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372; Sabino Cassese, La partecipazione dei
privati alle decisioni pubbliche. Saggio di diritto comparator, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE
DIRITTO PUBBLICO 15 (2007).
142
See Roberto Caranta, Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability – is there a
Common European Theoretical Framework?, in LEGITIMACY IN EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: REFORM AND RECONSTRUCTION 175 (Matthias Ruffert ed., Europa Law Publishing
2011).
143
European Governance, at 19, COM (2002) 704 final.
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and influence, a sort of competitive market for CSOs where information
about their doings is widely available.144
D. Participation and Lobbying
At least a passing reference is then due to lobbying. In an ideal
world, lobbying should take place through participatory procedures
articulated according to the transparency principle. CSOs and other actors
involved in participation as consultation and participation as co-decision are
actually pressing their concern through the procedures. Participation could
thus be seen as “lobbying civilized.”145
However, in many jurisdictions, actors involved in advocacy and
pressure groups operate outside the procedures, trying to influence the
decision-makers, be they bureaucrats or elected officials, including members
of parliament. Lobbying constantly and easily risks favoring special interests
if not degenerating into outright corruption.
The E.U. has taken some steps to try and make sure that this is not
the case. As already recalled, the 2002 Communication, Towards a
reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission,
lists openness and accountability among the leading principles for
consultations. The idea is that the “interested parties must themselves operate
in an environment that is transparent, so that the public is aware of the parties
involved in the consultation processes and how they conduct themselves.”
Therefore, information must be provided and published on the website for
consultation as to which interest the CSOs represent and as to how inclusive
that representation is. If the information is not provided, submissions will be
considered as individual contributions.146
However, the worst abuses in influence peddling take place outside
formalized consultation procedures. A few years after the 2002
Communication, the Commission published a Green Paper titled European
Transparency Initiative, which tries to address these problems.147 Building
on the 2002 general principles and minimum standard, the Green Paper

144
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (explaining the necessity of transparency to
strengthen the representativeness of CSOs); Bignami, supra note 47, at 68 (providing an
account of the development of the transparency principle in the E.U.). But see Harlow, supra
note 59, at 199 (providing an example of how transparency is not well received by
academics).
145
See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 217; Bouza García, supra note 34, at 174
(providing a way for participation and lobbying to be distinguished).
146
European Governance, at 17, COM (2002) 704 final.
147
European Transparency Initiative, COM (2006) 194 final; see also David
Coen, Lobbying in the European Union, CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (2007),
http://www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1211469722_lobbying_eu.pdf.
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stressed the need to improve the openness and transparency of the operation
of E.U. institutions.148
Following the consultations of the Green Paper, the E.U.
Commission published a new Communication Follow-up to the Green Paper,
“European Transparency Initiative,” which set up the Register of Interest
Representatives.149 The Commission has favored a voluntary and incentivebased approach, meaning that there is no obligation to register, but the
Commission will combine the Register with a standard template for Internet
consultations, and those participating in a consultation are systematically
invited to register. Those registered have to provide information on the
interests they represent, their mission, and how they are funded.150 A new
Code of Conduct for the relations with interest representatives was also
approved; respect for this Code is a condition for both registration and
permanence of the registration. Basically, interest representatives are
expected to apply the principles of openness, transparency, honesty and
integrity, while Members of the Commission and staff are bound by strict
rules ensuring their impartiality.151
Finally, last year the E.U. Commission and the E.U. Parliament
signed an inter-institutional agreement on the establishment of a transparency
register for organizations and self-employed individuals engaged in E.U.
policy-making and policy implementation, which basically establishes a
Register and a Code of Conduct common for lobbying with the two
institutions.152 Breach of the Code may entail among other measures the
exclusion of the delinquent organization or individual from the Register and
the interdiction of access to the European Parliament.153 It is, however,
evident that while lobbying can be directed through the participatory
procedures managed by the Commission, the political nature of the

148
European Transparency Initiative, at 2, COM (2006) 194 final (“The
Commission believes that high standards of transparency are part of the legitimacy of any
modern administration. The European public is entitled to expect efficient, accountable and
service-minded public institutions and that the power and resources entrusted to political and
public bodies are handled with care and never abused for personal gain.”).
149
Follow-up to the Green Paper ‘European Transparency Initiative,’ COM
(2007) 127 final.
150
See also European Transparency Initiative: A framework for relations with
interest representatives (Register and Code of Conduct), COM (2008) 323 final, available at
http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm; European Transparency Initiative: the
Register of Interest Representative, one year after COM (2009) 612 final.
151
European Transparency Initiative: A framework for relations with interest
representatives (Register and Code of Conduct), at 6, COM (2008) 323 final.
152
Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission
on the establishment of a transparency register for organisations and self-employed
individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation, 191 OFFICIAL J. 29
(2011),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2011:191:0029:01:EN:HTML.
153
Id. at art. 18.
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Parliament makes domesticating lobbies more difficult.154 While the Council
and the Member States, which through the same Council play a very relevant
role in E.U. lawmaking, have yet to associate themselves with the European
Transparency initiative, CSOs make an important portion of registered
interest representatives.155
The E.U., as was already plain upon a reading of the Green Paper on
European Transparency Initiative, has benefited from the U.S. experience of
regulating lobbies.156 The U.S. experience, which additionally is
characterized by money-thirsty politicians to an extent without comparison in
Europe, in turn bears witness to the difficulties in effectively addressing the
problems of the preferential access the lobbies try to obtain.157 The problem
obviously is that “Federal and state legislation (even local government
regulation) can dramatically affect the profitability of any business.”158 What
can be conclusively said here is that open and transparent participatory
procedure may be a cure for the worst aspects of lobbying, which itself
thrives in democratically representative environments.159
E. Global CSOs
The increased role of CSOs is also a result of globalization.160 “The
influence, reach, presence, and power of . . . international NGOs have grown
fantastically in the past two decades.”161 The inability of both traditional
international organizations and of States to effectively address important
global problems such as the protection of the environment, climate change,
or the safeguarding of human rights,162 has created a vacuum that CSOs try

154

See Insight: Euro MPs exposed in ‘cash-for-laws’ scandal, THE SUNDAY
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/ sto/news/insight/article582604.ece.
155
See European Transparency Initiative: the Register of Interest Representative,
one year after COM (2009) 612 final; Israel De Jesús Butler, Non-Governmental
Organisation Participation in the EU Law-Making Process: The Example of Social NonGovernmental Organisations at the Commission, Parliament and Council, 14 EUR. L.J. 558
(2008) (providing an insight on how CSOs penetrate policy making in the E.U.).
156
European Transparency Initiative, COM (2006) 194 final.
157
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards A Madisonian “Interest-Group” Approach
To Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2007); see also Heidi Reamer Anderson,
Allocating influence, 3 UTAH L. REV. 683, 705 (2009).
158
T. Hearne & A. Blunt, Federal Lobbying Regulation, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J.
65 (2008). The authors are more sympathetic to lobbying than academic writers, et pour
cause.
159
Public choice theory has shed light on the role of lobbies and special interests,
which is unduly ignored by much of constitutional law thinking. See Geoffrey P. Miller,
Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 83 (1989).
160
L. David Brown et al., Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations, 1, 2
(2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253110 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.253110.
161
Anderson, supra note 1, at 842.
162
Gartner, supra note 59, at 596.
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to fill.163 At the same time, new technologies have contributed greatly to
enabling and empowering advocacy at the global level.164
Involvement of CSOs has also been sought as a way to strengthen
the legitimacy of the international organizations and their activities; the wellknown instance of the World Bank shows that the involvement of CSOs can
lower the risk of poor performance, thus enhancing the effectiveness of
financial assistance.165 On this stage, too, the role of CSOs has been
criticized as lacking legitimacy.166 The criticism of opacity and elitism when
leveled at global CSOs may have merits, but it bites less strongly when one
considers the traditional lack of transparency in diplomatic negotiations.167
VI. THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
OR SECTIONS THEREOF AND INDIVIDUALS
Managerial reforms in administrative law acting in unison with the
participatory drive that was analyzed in the previous sections of this work
have conspired to enhance the role of both the market and the civil society in
providing services to the general public, or sections thereof, on behalf of the
State.168
Having recourse to the E.U. legal jargon, these services may be
services of general interest (“SGI”), and more specifically services of general
economic interest (“SGEI”), if the competent authority so decided.169 The

163
It is submitted that linking the increased role of CSOs on the international stage
is a consequence of the shift from government to governance. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at
374.
164
David Brown, supra note 160, at 2; see Donald J. Kochan, The Blogosphere
and the New Pamphleteers, 11 NEXUS L.J. 101 (2006).
165
See Gartner, supra note 59, at 611, 626.
166
Compare Anderson, supra note 1, at 846, with Gartner, supra note 59, at 599.
See Harlow, supra note 59, at 198.
167
See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 375 (doubting the possibility to transplant
transparency and participation at the global stage).
168
See Gavin Drewry, Law and Administration, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 258 (B. Guy Peters & J. Pierre eds., Sage 2003) (“In countries that have
undergone variants of the New Public Management reform, patterns of judicial review (and
other mechanisms of accountability) have reflected a continuing struggle to keep abreast of
the changing machinery of state functions and services, and to establish a workable line of
demarcation between public law per se and private law (including the law of contract and the
law of tort) as it applies in the context of public functions and state power.”).
169
See generally J. Vaquero Cruz, Beyond Competition: Services of General
Interest and European Community Law, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE. IN SEARCH OF
SOLIDARITY 170 (Gráinne de Búrca ed., Oxford University Press 2005); M. Lombard,
L’impact du droit communautaire sur les services publics, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
EUROPÉEN 969 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant 2007); D. Ritleng,
L’influence du droit communautaire sur les catégories organiques du droit administratif , in
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF EUROPEEN 866 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant
2007) ; J. Ziller, Les droits administratifs nationaux: caractéristiques générales, in DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF EUROPEEN 546 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant 2007).
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provision of SGEI has been externalized more often than not,170 and CSOs
may be involved in the delivery of these services.171 In line with a tradition
of limited or self-government in the U.S., the private, not-for-profit sector is
also delivering services.172
The role of CSOs is of course not necessarily limited to the provision
of SGEI. They may actually provide services that the State or another
competent authority has not deemed in the general interest and to whose
provision it does not commit taxpayers’ money, though such services may be
sought after.
CSOs may provide services either on a charitable base, using the
money of donors, or—and this is quite often the case when the service has
been classed as SGI, implying a duty for the competent public administration
to make sure that the service is provided (normally) according to the
principle of the universal service—thanks to financial contributions from the
same administration.
The two cases raise different legal questions, even if at times the two
situations are not well-distinguished, as when some public authority—as is
often the case in the E.U. and in some of its Member States—is willing to
distribute public money to strengthen civil society quite independently from
the provision of any specific service.173
A. Charitable Actions
From the point of view of administrative law, charitable actions by
CSOs do not pose major problems. No taxpayer money is involved, and
coordinating the services provided by the public administration with the
services provided by these organizations simply makes sense. The main
question is whether, as is the case with investors and consumers, law has a
role in imposing transparency rules to the benefit of contributors. This
question is particularly pertinent, and again the analogy with investors is
appropriate, when considering small donors.174

170
See generally Catherine Donnelly, The Response of English Public Law to
Private Actors in Public Governance, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR
TRANSFORMATION? 169 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009); Le esternalizzazioni, (C. Mignone
et al. eds., Bonomia University Press, 2007).
171
See Brown, supra note 160, at 14; Bignami, supra note 6, at 889 (explaining
how in some jurisdictions, corporate traditions have CSOs, such as trade unions,
institutionally involved in the management of public sector organizations).
172
Luton, supra note 18, at 174.
173
See Christine Mahoney & Michael Beckstrand, Following the Money:
European Union Funding of Civil Society Organizations, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1339
(2011).
174
This aspect is somewhat linked to the idea of “internal” accountability. See
Anderson, supra note 1, at 842. But in so far as donors do not have associate status in the
relevant CSO, it falls rather somewhere between “internal” and “external” accountability.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

35

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4

74

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

The same kind of rules might, of course, benefit major
philanthropists. The later, however, normally have the financial clout to
either create and essentially directly manage their own CSO (just think of the
Gates Foundation) or to use civil law—including corporate governance
rules—to take part in the management (or at least to be fully informed of the
choices made by the CSO) and— more importantly—of the results achieved.
Philanthropic venture capital is becoming a term of art, even if its actual
legal configuration still needs to be investigated.175
B. Providing Services for Consideration
Each legal system possesses its own solutions as to how
public goods are provided. The way they are performed
depends on how, in one particular system, the distribution of
functions between public institutions and private entities
taking part in the management of public duties is legally
arranged: this is about the delineation of those public duties
which must be directly performed by public institutions and
those which may be partly assumed by private entities; about
the type of contracts through which part of public tasks can
be entrusted to private entities; about the recognition of
something like a ‘third sector’, acting between public
authorities and the market, and so on. What can also vary is
the means by which the performance of public goods is
monitored, assessed, and whether there are legal remedies
available to those dissatisfied with the quality of the
provision.176
In the E.U., the Court of Justice has many times stressed that it is the
responsibility of Member States to decide whether to use their own resources
and personnel to deliver SGEI or to outsource delivery to the market.177

175

See ROB JOHN, VENTURE PHILANTHROPY:
THE EVOLUTION OF HIGH
ENGAGEMENT PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE, (Alex Nicholls & Rowena Young eds., Oxford
University
2006),
available
at
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/skoll/research/
Short+papers/Venture+Philanthropy+in+Europe.htm.
176
J-B Auby, Public Goods and Global Administrative Law, in VALUES IN
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 239, 241(Gordon Antony et al. eds., Hart 2011) (also referring
to STEPHEN OSBORNE, THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
(Routledge 2008)).
177
See, e.g., Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, 2005 E.C.R. I-1, at ¶48 (“A public
authority which is a contracting authority has the possibility of performing the tasks conferred
on it in the public interest by using its own administrative, technical and other resources,
without being obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own departments.”);
see also ALBERT SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND EU COMPETITION RULES, 27,
232 (Hart 2011); Fotini Avarkioti, The Application of EU Public Procurement Rules to “Inhouse” Arrangements, 16 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 22 (2007).
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With that said, the outsourcing trend has obviously affected the
provision of services of general interest in Europe as much as in the rest of
the world. More and more, the market and the third sector are called in to
provide services of general interest in lieu and on behalf of the State and its
articulations. Basically, this can be arranged in two ways. The simplest is the
result of a combination of an accreditation system with fixed amount
payments. The other is through public procurement procedures, possibly
including “set aside” mechanisms. Theoretically, it is of course possible to
think of a third possibility: direct contracting between the public authority
responsible for the service provision and a contractor. This approach is
however neither transparent nor generally speaking efficient, and therefore
its legality is simply ruled out in the E.U. and in other jurisdictions.178
The combination of an accreditation system with fixed amount
payments is, for instance, used in Italy in the framework of the NHS.
Diagnostic services can be provided by both the NHS itself through its
structures, such as hospitals and so on, or through accredited private
providers, which in theory can be managed by both for-profit firms and
CSOs. It is fair to say that, in the main, this market space is mostly occupied
by commercial firms—CSOs apparently not being interested or good enough
at competing in this market. As a consequence, it does not strain reality too
greatly to assume that CSOs stand a chance in outsourcing services based on
public procurement only when there is some form of set aside.
The U.S. is paradise for set aside.179 This includes small businesses,
women owned small businesses, service disabled veterans, and many
others.180 In the E.U., the situation is more complex. The non-discrimination
principle is paramount in public procurement.181 There is, however, the
problem of the old Sodemare case, in which the Court of Justice held that:
[A] Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it
retains to organize its social security system, consider that a
social welfare system of the kind at issue in this case
necessarily implies, with a view to attaining its objectives,
178

See, e.g., Case C-119/06, Comm’n v. Italy, 2008 E.C.R. I-168, ¶34; see Adrian
Brown, Application of the Directives to Contracts to Non-for-profit Organizations and
Transparency under the EC Treaty: A Note on Case C-119/06 Commission v Italy’, 17 PUB.
PROCUREMENT L. REV. NA96 (2008).
179
The U.K. ended up aborting a similar evolution. Martin Trybus, Sustainability
and Value for Money: Social and Environmental Consideration in United Kingdom Public
Procurement Law, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS IN EUROPE 262
(Roberto Caranta & Martin Trybus eds., DJØF 2010); Roberto Caranta & Sara Richetto,
Sustainable Procurements in Italy: Of Light and Some Shadows, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND
SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS 147 (2010) (Italy).
180
See generally OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, www.sba.gov/aboutoffices-content/1/2986.
181
See, e.g., Case C-21/88, Du Pont De Nemours, 1990 E.C.R. I-889; see Sue
Arrowsmith, The Legality of ‘Secondary’ Procurement Policies under the Treaty of Rome and
the Works Directive, 1 (1992) PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 408, 410 (1992).
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that the admission of private operators to that system as
providers of social welfare services is to be made subject to
the condition that they are non-profit-making.182
The Commission’s communication on “Implementing the
Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the
European Union” points to the application of the general public procurement
rules and principles: “In such cases, the public body delegating a social
mission of general interest to an external organization must, at the very least,
respect the principles of transparency, equal treatment and proportionality.
Moreover, in certain cases, the public contracts directives impose more
specific obligations.”183 Moreover, an exception is spelled out in Art. 19 of
Directive 2004/18/EC, under which “Member States may reserve the right to
participate in public contract award procedures to sheltered workshops . . .
where most of the employees concerned are handicapped persons who, by
reason of the nature or the seriousness of their disabilities, cannot carry on
occupations under normal conditions.”184 Basically, under E.U. law, there are
some limited possibilities to set aside contracts for certain kinds of economic
operators (E.U. jargon for the partners of contracting authorities), which as
far as social services are considered, could also be CSOs.
Setting aside, however, cannot be equated with a direct award.
Competition is restricted to those economic operators belonging to the
targeted categories, including in some cases CSOs, but competition is still
present within the category. Award procedure will have to follow the usual
rules basically centered on the principles of equal treatment and
transparency.185
E.U. public procurement law is currently under reconsideration. The
2011 Green Paper “on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy”

182

Case C-70/95, Sodemare, 1997 E.C.R. I-3395, at ¶32; see also relativa a la
aplicación a los servicios de interés económico general y, en particular, a los servicios
sociales de interés general, de las normas de la Unión Europea en materia de ayudas
estatales, de contratos públicos y de Mercado Interior, at 4.2.10, SEC (2010) 1545 def (July
12, 2010).
183
Mettre en œuvre le programme communautaire de Lisbonne Les services
sociaux d'intérêt général dans l'Union européenne, at 2.2.1, COM (2006) 177 final (Apr. 26,
2006).
184
See also Council Directive 2004/17/EC, art. 27, 2004 (L 134/1); CHRISTOPHER
MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT & LEGAL
CHANGE 4, 56 (Oxford University Press 2007) (outlining the history of sheltered workshops);
Roberto Caranta, Sustainable Public Procurement in the EU, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND
SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS IN EUROPE 38 (Roberto Caranta & Martin Trybus eds., DJØF 2010);
Joel Arnould, Secondary Policies in Public Procurement: The Innovations of the New
Directives, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 187, 193 (2004).
185
See Roberto Caranta, The Borders of EU Public Procurement Law, in OUTSIDE
THE EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE – INSIDE THE TREATY? 25 (Dacian Dragos & Roberto
Caranta eds., DJØF 2012).
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quotes from the Staff working document already referred to.186 It also
addresses a question to potential respondents on whether the Directives
should allow the possibility of reserving contracts involving social services
to NGOs or whether there should be other privileges for such organisations
in the context of the award of social services contracts.187
The proposal for new procurement directives tabled late last year
provides for both watering down the criteria for qualification of sheltered
workshops and for special rules for the procurement of social services.
According to Recital 11 of the proposal, services to the person, such as
certain social, health, and educational services are provided within a
particular context that varies widely amongst Member States, due to different
cultural traditions. A specific regime should therefore be established for
public contracts for these services, with a higher threshold of EUR 500.000.
Given the importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of these
services, Member States should be given wide discretion to organise the
selection of service providers in the way they consider most appropriate. The
proposed rules take account of that imperative, imposing only observance of
basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and making sure that
contracting authorities are able to apply specific quality criteria for the
choice of service providers. Member States and public authorities remain
free to provide these services themselves or to organise social services in a
way that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example
through the mere financing of such services or by granting licences or
authorisations to all economic operators meeting the conditions established
beforehand by the contracting authority, without any limits or quotas,
provided such a system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the
principles of transparency and non-discrimination.
It is remarkable that both the procurement and the accreditation
options are allowed, but no provision is made for set aside for civil society
organisations. However, as already recalled, the possibility to reserve
contracts is widened beyond sheltered workshops for the disabled.188
Of lately, outsourcing and civil society involvement have taken a
new and maybe surprising twist. An interesting case is provided by the UK
Localism Act 2011. The Act implements some aspects of the “Big Society”
doctrine expounded by David Cameron, the present prime Minister. Part 5 of
the Act deals with “community empowerment.” Section 81 allows any
186

On the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more
efficient European Procurement Market, at ¶4.4, COM (2011) 15 final (Jan. 27, 2011).
187
Id. at Question 97, ¶1.2.
188
See proposed new Article 17 (“Member States may reserve the right to
participate in public procurement procedures to sheltered workshops and economic operators
whose main aim is the social and professional integration of disabled and disadvantaged
workers or provide for such contracts to be performed in the context of sheltered employment
programmes, provided that more than 30% of the employees of those workshops, economic
operators or programmes are disabled or disadvantaged workers.”). In any case, a call for
competition is required.
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relevant body, including voluntary or community bodies, bodies of persons
or a trust established for charitable purposes only, and parish councils to
express their interest in providing or assisting in providing a service of
general interest on behalf of the local authority. Section 81(7) defines a
“voluntary body” as a body, other than a public or local authority, the
activities of which are not carried on for profit, while Section 81(8) provides
that the fact that a body’s activities generate a surplus does not prevent it
from being a voluntary body so long as that surplus is used for the purposes
of those activities or invested in the community. Under Section 83(8), the
relevant authority in deciding about an expression of interest must consider
whether acceptance of the expression of interest would promote or improve
the social, economic, or environmental well-being of the authority’s area.
The need for transparency is attended to in the same Section 83. If
the authority accepts the expression of interest it must carry out a
procurement exercise relating to the provision on behalf of the authority of
the relevant service to which the expression of interest relates (public
procurement or concession for services); the procurement procedure
followed must be appropriate, having regard to the value and nature of the
contract that may be awarded. Since, at present, service concessions are only
marginally ruled under E.U. and U.K. law (and the same applies to below the
threshold service procurement contracts), Section 83 further details the rules
to be followed, including minimum periods for submitting tenders and
publication of details of the specifications.189 Moreover, under Section 83(9),
the authority must consider how it might promote or improve the social,
economic, or environmental well-being of the authority’s area.
One might easily dismiss the Localism Act as a new ruse to rein in
public expenses and roll further back the borders of the State, introducing
new forms of privatization.190 Indeed, the first sections of the Act regulate
referenda relating to council tax increases and other fiscal matters
reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher policy to rein in spend-happy (or so
perceived) local labor councils.191 As we have seen, however, the greater
involvement of the civil society in delivering public policy is not something
new, nor necessarily something very right-wing and conservative.
Already in 2001, against a quite different ideological background—
one marked by a traditionally important involvement of both the Church and
lay organizations in the provision of social services—the new Article 118 of
189
See Roberto Caranta, The Borders of EU Public Procurement Law, in OUTSIDE
EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE – INSIDE THE TREATY? 25 (Dacian Dragos & Roberto
Caranta eds., DJØF 2012).
190
See Jay Kennedy, Eric Pickles’ Localism Bill contains a Trojan Horse, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/voluntary-sectornetwork/2011/feb/11/localism-bill-tojan-horse (referring to the Bill later voted into the
Localism Act).
191
See Eoin Carolan, Legitimising Disaggregated Governance: Accountability,
Experimentalism and Democracy in the Big Society, PUB. L. (2012) (forthcoming).
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the Italian Constitution introduced the idea of horizontal subsidiarity, that is,
the preferential involvement of CSOs in the provision of those services.192
At present, Italian law is however somewhat less firm than the
Localism Act 2011, in holding that civil society involvement must take place
through open and competitive procurement procedures.193
VII. CONCLUSION
“Theories of administration and administrative law have changed
dramatically in recent times.”194
One element of the evolution toward a new paradigm is indeed the
new relevance of civil society and its organizations. CSOs today play
important roles in both policy design and policy delivery.195 While in some
quarters CSOs are seen as upholding the legitimacy of representative
institutions196—albeit weakly democratic—others lament the lack of
legitimacy of the CSOs themselves.197
The most sensible way out of this conundrum seems to be enhancing
transparency in—and competition among—the CSOs, rather than killing or
maiming participation.198 Strengthening participation beyond consultations199
implies the necessity to devise mechanisms to select which CSOs are to
participate because an “everyone welcome” approach would make decisionmaking procedures too cumbersome.200
In this respect, the E.U. is hindered by the traditions of corporatism.
In Europe, generally, few large organizations are given privileged access to
regulatory and administrative proceedings, apart from self-regulating powers.
The U.S. adversarial—or pluralist—approach, instead, sees many different
CSOs competing for relevance and influence.201
The pluralist approach is obviously preferable, in that it makes the
capture of the CSOs more difficult when compared with cozy corporatist
arrangements. The point is how the competition can be rendered open and
fair. Transparency is obviously of paramount importance here, and one
relevant element in this respect is reputation. As it has been remarked, “Since
192
See generally Tania Groppi, Italy. The Subsidiarity Principle, 4 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 131 (2006); A. POGGI, LE AUTONOMIE FUNZIONALI TRA SUSSIDIARIETÀ VERTICALE E
SUSSIDIARIETÀ ORIZZONTALE (Giuffré 2001).
193
See Caranta & Richetto, supra note 179.
194
Bignami, supra note 6, at 860.
195
See id. at 905 (explaining that the role of CSOs, previously obscured by the
dominant paradigm of expert administration, has been brought to the light).
196
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 198; Bouza García, supra note 34, at 169;
Caranta, supra note 56, at 15.
197
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372; Casesse, supra note 141, at 15.
198
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (explaining the relevance of transparency).
199
See Mendes, supra note at 139, at 1849.
200
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209.
201
Bignami, supra note 6, at 885.
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NGOs are particularly vulnerable to threats to their reputations—and because
they are otherwise fairly weak actors who rely on their credibility for
influence—reputational concerns can be a powerful accountability
mechanism.”202
Moreover, “strictly corporatist models pose significant challenges at
the international level, in terms of how such organizations would be selected
and the risk that rigidities could evolve that would exclude emerging
stakeholders.”203 What plays at the international level will play at regional or
State level, as well, and here again the reference to competitive market
concepts (think new entrants, but also incumbents) is manifest.204
As CSOs contribute to the transparency of governance mechanisms,
the question of their own transparency is unavoidable. In particular,
“fiduciary institutions of a nonprofit nature . . . owe obligations of public
trust.”205 The role of law here is to provide rules which force or at least
encourage CSOs to disclose data concerning, for instance, membership,
sources of funding, ways funds are spent, and results achieved.206 In a way, a
sort of CSO market regulatory framework is necessary for the accountability
of CSOs both to their members and to the public at large affected by their
contribution to policy formation.207
Finally, when, as is the case with the E.U., CSOs are at times seen as
sources of expertise, rather than “general,” “political,” or “democratic,”
legitimacy, fair and open competitive selection mechanism are needed, and
the model here can be the principles and rules of public procurement
discussed above.208
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See Roberto Caranta, Transparence et concurrence, in DROIT COMPARÉ DES
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